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NOTES
RIGHT OF PURCHASER OF CASINGHEAD GAS TO INCOME TAX
DEDUCTIONS FOR DEPLETION*
TAX ADMINISTRATION of the problem of depletion allowances has departed
so far from the generally accepted meaning of the term "depletion" that it is
necessary for purposes of clarity to divorce the idea from superimposed legal
concepts. Depletion is geologically defined as a gradual process of diminu-
tion of the mineral content of land by severance of the minerals.' As used
by accountants the term signifies a reduction in the value of capital assets
caused by their consumption.2 Accordingly, when Congress provided for the
granting of a reasonable allowance for depletion with respect to incomes
gained from mines and oil and gas wells,3 it presumably intended to exclude
from taxation that part of the taxpayer's annual gross income which repre-
sents a reduction in the value of his capital assets. 4 When the last of the
mineral assets has been removed, the sum total of the depletion allowances
theoretically should equal the original value of the minerals in place, that is,
the original capital assets.5 The administrative difficulties of ascertaining the
exact quantity of migratory oil and gas reserves obviously precludes a high
degree of accuracy in application of the theory.0 Yet in determining who
* Bankline Oil Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 90 F. (2d) 899 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937), ceri,
granted, U. S. Sup. Ct., (1937) 5 U. S. L. WERE 168.
1. McGrath, Hoze Should Depletion and Depreciation Be Charged? (1922) 113
ENGINEERING AND MINING JOURNAL 993.
2. 2 KESTER, ACCOUNTING THEORY AND PRACTICE (3rd ed. 1933) 362.
3. For a collection of the depletion provisions of the various revenue acts see
2 PAUL AND MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1934) § 21.03 el seq.;
Helvering v. Twin Bell Oil Syndicate, 293 U. S. 312, 315 (1934). The Revenue Acts
have varied greatly as to the bases of computing depletion, but little as to the parties
entitled to an allowance. The second question has been shifted to the courts under the
clause, "a reasonable allowance for depletion . . . , according to the peculiar condi-
tions in each case, . . .." which appears in 40 STAT. 1067 (1918), Rev. Act of 1918,
§214(a) (10) (individuals); §234(a) (9) (corporations) and all subsequent Rev.
Acts. A few isolated interests have been specifically named as being entitled to an
allowance. Ibid. (lessor and lessee) and subsequent Rev. Acts; 45 STAT. 800 (1928),
Rev. Act of 1928, § 23(l) (life tenant to the exclusion of remaindermen; income bene-
ficiaries and trustee) and subsequent Rev. Acts.
4. Helvering v. Falk, 291 U. S. 183, 187 (1934); Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet,
287 U. S. 299, 302 (1932).
5. Ritter Lumber Co., 30 B. T. A. 231, 262 (1934); 2 PAUL AND MHERTENS, LAW
OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1936 Supp.) § 21.01.
6. From 1918 through 1925 depletion was computed on the alternative bases of
cost or of fair market value of gas or oil on date of discovery or thirty days thereafter
[40 STAT. 1067 (1918), Rev. Act of 1918, §214(a) (10); 42 STAT. 241 (1921), Rev.
Act of 1921, §214(a) (10); 43 STAT. 260 (1924), Rev. Act of 1924, §204(c)]. In
1926 Congress, realizing the impossibility of valuing migratory mineral assets, substi-
tuted gross income for the previous base of discovery value [44 STAT. 16, Rev. Act of
1926, §204(c) (2)]. For an analysis of the methods of computing depletion allow-
ances, see Comment (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 466.
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is entitled to a depletion allowance, and in what amount, the basic principle
must be kept in mind.
In a recent opinion 7 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that a contract purchaser of casinghead gas had a depletable interest.
An owner of oil lands contracted to sell his entire output of casinghead or
wet gas to the taxpayer in return for a percentage of the taxpayer's income
on the gasoline recovered from the purchased gas.8 The taxpayer-vendee
acquired no interest in fle gas in place, but only a right to pipe the severed
gas from the mouth of the well. Nevertheless, he was held to have some
undefined "economic interest" entitling him to a depletion deduction from
his gross income amounting to 2731% of the difference between the contract
price and the fair market value of the purchased gas where the latter is the
higher sum. This was deemed complementary to depletion allowed the
vendor and producer of the gas as measured by the contract price.
Although there is authority for the decision in several lower federal court
opinions,9 the vendee would not seem to be entitled to the allowance under
the geological concept of depletion developed under the guiding hand of the
Supreme Court. It was first held that ownership of the absolute fee was
necessary to entitle the taxpayer to an allowance.1 This attitude was modi-
fied by a subsequent holding that a lessee, by virtue of his right to remove
minerals in place and retain part of them, has a "sufficient property interest"
in the land to entitle him to a depletion allowance; at the same time, the
lessor, by reason of his right to receive a portion of the production in the
nature of a royalty, is also entitled to an allowance on his share of the pro-
duction. Accordingly, the lessor's gross income for income tax purposes
is reduced by 273/27% of the value of that portion of the produced oil which
is turned over to him by the lessee as royalty in the nature of rent, while
the lessee's gross income is reduced by 27j % of the portion of the oil
7. Bankline Oil Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 90 F. (2d) 899 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937),
cert. granted, U. S. Sup. Ct., (1937) 5 U. S. L, ,VEEt: 168.
8. For a general discussion of the casinghead gas industry together with a treat-
ment of the forms of contracts usually employed, consult GtssmInE, OIL AnD GAS
LEASES AND ROYALTIES (1935) § 57 et seq.
9. Bo.nton Gasoline Co., 10 B. T. A. 19 (1928); Boynton Gasoline Co., 6 B. T. A.
434 (1927) ; T. D. 3295. art. 223, 24 T. D. Int. Rev. 290 (1922) : T. D. 340. art. 225,
26 T. D. Int. Rev. 822 (1924); see Lomita Gasoline Co., 33 B. T. A. 385 (1935)
(depletion disallowed for lack of proper evidence): Rainhuw Gasoline Corp.. 31 B.T.A.
1050 (1935) (depletion denied on other grounds). But cf. T. D. 3922. art. 223, 28
T. D. Int. Rev. 635 (1926) (art. 223 similar to correspmnding articles of 1922 and
1924 except sentence allowing depletion in princiral case has been deleted). Accord:
Signal Gasoline Corp. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev.. 66 F. t2d) PF6 (C. C.A. 9th. 1933).
Contra: Coyle, 17 B.T.A. 368 (1929); G. C. 'M. 0253. IX-2 Ct.t. DiiL. 232 (1930);
see Hurley v. United States. 10 F. Supp. 365. 36.7 (X. D. OQla. 1935s.
10. Weiss v. Mohawk Mining Co.. 24;4 Fed. 502 (C. C. A. 6th. 1920'. Tln. d., iiii
has been explained as a misinterpretation of United State, v. Biwabik Co. 247 U. S.
116 (1918). See HOLME-S. FEDERAL TAXES (0th ed. 1925) 1143.
11. Lvnch v. Alhvorth-Stephens Co.. 267 U. S. 3tt4 (l192z ',re mivej
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which he retains.12 The sum of the reductions allowed equals 27312% of the
value of the total oil produced, 27Y2% representing Congress' arbitrary
evaluation of the oil in place, and 7 2 Y/a % representing the increase in value
attributable to the process of severence13 The ruling is supportable on the
ground that the lessee had an interest in the minerals in place by virtue of
his right to remove part of the minerals for his own use, and therefore ex-
traction of those minerals constituted a depletion of his capital assets.
But introduction of the phrase "sufficient property interest" had unfortunate
consequences, for the vagueness of the test misled other courts into holding
that a lessee who had assigned his property interest and retained only an
overriding royalty, i.e., a right to a percentage of production, was entitled
to no depletion allowance since he had parted with his control over, and
interest in, the land.14 When the Supreme Court overruled these decisions
and granted the lessee-assignor a depletion allowance in Palmer v. Bcnder,1
it used a new phrase, "sufficient economic interest," apparently to signify
the immateriality of the legalistic question of title to the oil in place, and not
to establish any new criterion of an undefined economic interest. The real
criterion advanced was the acquisition and retention of some interest in the
oil in place and the securing of an income from the extraction of that oil.10
The principal case would seem to read into the phrase "economic interest"
a content not intended by the Palmer decision and to give it some indefinite
meaning totally divorced from any idea of return of capital assets. Since
the vendor of the wet gas was granted a depletion allowance of 2 7Y2% of
the proceeds of all gas extracted, with the necessary result that the value
of the capital assets depleted will be returned in their entirety to him, no
allowance can logically be granted the vendee on the theory of a return
of the value of capital assets depleted by severance. The vendee was merely
a purchaser of the gas already severed, and acquired no interest in the gas
in place.17 This is made evident by the fact that the purchaser would be
12. Helvering v. Twin Bell Oil Syndicate, 293 U. S. 312 (1934). 40 STAT. 1067,
Rev. Act of 1918 § 214(a) (10) (individuals); § 234(a) (9) (corporations) and all
subsequent Revenue Acts provide for an equitable apportionment of deductions between
lessor and lessee.
13. Signal Gasoline Corp. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 77 F. (2d) 728, 730 (C. C. A.
9th, 1935).
14. T. L. James, 17 B. T. A. 239 (1929). For a collection of cases denying deple-
tion to assignors of various types of interests who retain royalties, see 371 C. C. H.
1937 Fed. Tax Serv. 1240.143.
15. 287 U. S. 551 (1933).
16. Id. at 557.
17. In Signal Gasoline Corp. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 66 F. (2d) 886 (C. C. A.
9th, 1933), the court laid down the doctrine that a purchaser of wet gas had an interest
in the gas in place because of his contract duty to aid in the production of the gas he
was to buy by creating a vacuum within the wet gas line. The validity of such a
position is doubtful [see Hurley v. United States, 10 F. Supp. 365 (N. D. Okla. 1935) ;
and Bankline Oil Co., 33 B. T. A. 910, 916 (1936)], and would seem to confuse contract
duties and rights in surface land with rights in minerals. In the principal case the court
realized that the situation was distinguishable on the facts since the taxpayer was under
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granted no allowance whenever the fair market value declines to or below the
contract price. Apparently the court has invented a peculiar type of capital
asset which appears and disappears with the rise and fall of the fair market
value of wet gas. The taxpayer is deemed to have an interest in the assets
represented by the gas in place when the market is high, but no interest in
those assets when the market is low, even though he purchase the same
quantity of gas at both times.
As a favorable contract expires, or the quantity of gas reserves diminishes,
the purchaser is the loser in the sense that profits tend to diminish or may
cease altogether, but that fact is in no wise related to the concept of deple-
tion. Indeed, any theory supporting the deductions granted would be similar
to the distinctly different concept of amortization of the value of favorable
contracts' s for the purchase of coal,10 services,20 and leaseholds21 by yearly
deductions from the purchaser's taxable income of an amount equal to the
value of the contract divided by its duration in years. However, in every
such instance the amortized value of the contract was a definite investment
paid for the contract by way of assignment, whereas in the principal case
there was no such investment and the amount sought to be amortized under
the misnomer of depletion was not the value of the contract, which it re-
sembles in some respects, but in reality was an annual unearned increment
of profit. In other fields there has been no policy of exempting unearned
profits from taxation.2 2 Yet the principal case would seem to reverse that
policy by partially2 excluding the unearned increment from taxation. Such
an extension of tax exemption would mean an appreciable loss of revenue
to the government and would create difficulties necessarily accompanying the
process of valuing commodities which have no organized market.2 4 The im-
portance of these objections becomes apparent when it is realized that the
theory of the principal case, if carried to its logical conclusion, is applicable
to all profitable mineral and timber purchase contracts.
no duty to supply a vacuum. Bankline Oil Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev. 90 F. (2d) S99,
903 (C. C.A. 9th, 1937).
18. For a general discussion of this subject see 2 PAUL AND z v [rEnrs, LAw OF
FEDERAL INcomE TAXAT oN (1934) §20.64 et scq.; (1932) 32 CoL L REv. 387.
19. Powell Coal Co., 12 B. T. A. 492 (1928).
20. Houston Baseball Association, 24 B. T. A. 69 (1931).
21. For a collection of cases, see KLEIN, FED.EFL INcomE TAXATIO:; (1933 Supp.)
225.
22. Where property has been bought below its fair market value and later sold at
a profit, the increment of profit between cost and fair market value at the time of
purchase is taxable as income unless the taxpayer can prove it to be a gift fr,,rm the
original vendor. E. L. Jacobs, 20 B. T. A. 529 (1930); R. A. Otto, 19 B. T. A. 889
(1930); see G. Wildy Gibbs, 28 B. T. A. 18, 20 (1933); J. F. Prindible, 16 B. T. A.
187, 192 (1929).
23. The apparent misapplication of the depletion concept caused an exemption of
only 271A,% of the increment of profit.
24. Possible difficulties of valuation are clearly demonstrated in the principal case
where there was an absence of any market for wet gas. Bankline Oil Co. v. Comm'r
of Int. Rev., 90 F. (2d) 899, 904 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937). See Campbell, Deflplion of Oil
and Gas Properties Under the Act of 926 (1927) 5 NAT. I-,coztE TAx MAO. 51.
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FICTITIOUS PAYEE CHECKS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS *
AN ILLINOIS corporation sued in a New York court to recover from its
various New York drawees amounts debited to its account on checks drawn
to the order of fictitious payees. A dishonest employee in plaintiff's Chicago
office had procured the issuance of these checks allegedly without the com-
pany's knowledge by submitting to the checking department vouchers on
which he had substituted the name of the fictitious payee for the names of
the intended payees. After endorsing the checks to himself in the name of
the fictitious payee, and then endorsing them in his own name, the employee
deposited the checks in Chicago banks which forwarded them to New York
correspondents. The drawees paid out the proceeds to the latter and debited
plaintiff's account accordingly. The court assumed that by the law of New
York the banks would have been liable for payment on a forged indorsement
to an order instrument, for the New York courts consider a check made out
to a fictitious payee a bearer instrument only when its fictitious character
was known to the actual drawer. 1 Illinois law, on the other hand, regards
checks drawn to a fictitious payee with the knowledge of either drawer or his
employee as bearer instruments, with the result that indorsement is super-
fluous and consequently the drawee banks are not subjected to the responsi-
bility of one who has honored a forged indorsement. 2 After rehearsing the
confusion of New York authorities on the conflict of laws question thus pre-
sented,3 the court adopted the rule of the Restatement that the negotiability
of a mercantile instrument is determined by the law of the place of contract-
ing,4 which in this case was Illinois, and that therefore the checks were bearer
instruments, and the banks were entitled to debit the drawer's account.5
While the uniform legislation on negotiable instruments has lessened the
number of conflict of laws questions pertaining to bills and notes, 6 statutory
and judicial variations still occasion thorny conflicts problems. Their solution
* Swift and Co., Inc. v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 164 Misc. 320 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.
1937).
1. Jacoby v. Kline Bros. Co., Inc., 241 App. Div. 470, 272 N. Y. Supp. 871 (1st
Dep't 1934) ; N. Y. NEGOTlABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 28(3).
2. ILL REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) ch. 98, § 29(3), which was passed at the
instance of the American Banking Association following the decision in U. S. Cold
Storage Co. v. Central Mfg. District Bank, 343 Ill. 503, 175 N. E. 825 (L931). Similar
provisions exist in only two other states, IDAHO CoDE ANN. (1932) § 26-109(3) ; MoNT.
REv. CoDES ANN. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 8416(3); and England, BILLs OF
EXCHANGE Acr § 7(3).
3. See opinion in principal case, infra note 5, at 321.
4. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 336.
5. Swift and Co., Inc. v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 164 Misc. 320 (N. Y. Sup.
Ct. 1937).
For purposes of discussion, almost fifty contemporaneous memorandum decisions
by the same court in cases brought by the same plaintiff against a number of its New
York drawees and dealing with similar transactions, have been consolidated. N. Y. L. J.,
July 3, 1937, p. 35, col. 4 et seq. The court's brief statement of facts has been ampli-
fied by uncontroverted material from the memoranda of the parties.
6. See generally Buschmann, Some Conflict of Laws Problems Perfaining to Bills
and Notes (1933) 8 IND. L. J. 213.
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is complicated by the variety of conceptual approaches that may logically be
applied, and by the absence of compelling factors of social policy to direct a
choice. In the principal case, the court, by assuming that the controlling issue
was the negotiability of the instruments,- availed itself of the authorities hold-
ing that the proper law to determine negotiability is the law of the place of
contracting.8 Although in ordinary contracts, the ascertainment of the place
of contracting is comparatively easy,9 the multiplicity of contracts which may
be implied from checking transactions permits divergent results. Where the
liability of the drawer or indorser to a holder is in issue, it is relatively sim-
ple to fix the place of contracting at the spot where the check is delivered. 0
But here the drawees claim the right to debit the drawer's account, and the
question relates not to the liability on the checks, but to the mutual obliga-
tions of banks and a customer who draws a check in connection with a check-
ing account. Hence the place of contracting might be viewed not as the state
where a particular check happens to be drawn or negotiated, but where the
original agreement to conduct a checking account was made. This might be
either New York or Illinois. Or, on the other hand, the drawing of each
check might be regarded as the acceptance by the drawer of an offer of a
loan by the drawee:" in this event Illinois would be the place of contracting.
A different result might be reached by taking the approach that the ques-
tion directly involved here is not one of the validity of any contract but
rather one of performance, i.c., whether payment of the tic!itiuns payee
checks by the drawee banks discharged their contractual obligations to the
drawer customer arising out of the opening of the checking accoutits. r- Since
7. Obviously, if the law goverling the transactions views the chc-ks as order
instruments made out to a fictitious paie. since the payee is ex hypolhesi fictitious,
valid cndorsements would be impossible, and the chcks would therefore be non-nego-
tiable. See Prince. Forgery in the Lazw of Bills and AX',tes (1935) 5 Bn0OKLxN L REV. 1.
S. Howenstein v. Barnes, 5 Dill. 4S2, Fed. Cas. No. o7S6 (C. C. D. Kan. 1879);
Navajo County Bank v. Dolson, 163 Cal. 4$5, 12j Pac. 153 (1912); RLSmrATE:;.T CoN-
FLICT or LAws (1934) §336. But see Buschmami, supra w-te 0. at "_2.
9. See GooDenic, CONFLICT oF L.%ws (1927) 218-220. Traditicn alsu has standard-
ized the designation of the place of making of bills of exchange and promissory notes.
LoaxxzrN, CASES ON CONFLICT OF L ws (4th ed. 1937) 545. But the intricate relation-
ship of particular checks to the general checking account defies simple classification. The
Geneva conventions treat checks separately from bills of exchange and promissory
notes. See Hudson & Feller, The International U;nification of Laws Concerning Bills
of Exchange (1931) 44 HARv. L. Rav. 333: Feller, The International Unification of
La-ws Concenzing Checks (1932) 45 HARV. L. REV. tAR.
10. 2 BEALE, CoNFLICe OF LAWS (1935) 1048; Gutteridge, The Unification of the
Rules of Conflict Relating to Negotiable Instruments (1934) 16 J. Comr. LEG. & I:,r. L.
(3d ser.) 53. 6.
11. See Mfoore, Sussman and Brand, Legal and Institutional Methods App-ticd to
Orders to Stop Payment of Checks-I. Legal Method (1933) 42 YALE L J. 817, 818-23.
12. This analysis would distinguish the decisions adopting the h.r loci coniraclus
as involving the liability of drawer or indorscr to subsequent huldcrs and the availability
of defenses. Amsinck v. Rogers, 189 N. Y. 252, 82 N. E. 134 (1907); Hyatt v. Bank
of Kentucky, 8 Bush 193 (Ky. Ct. App. 1871) ; Hennenlotter v. DeOrvananos, 114 Misc.
333, 186 N. Y. Supp. 418 (Sup. Ct. 1921). Even where these issues are involved, many
authorities apply the lex loci sohntionis. Comment (1928) 37 YALE L J. 803, SO5.
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questions relating to the performance of a contract are governed by the law
of the place of performance, 3 the law of New York, where the checks were
honored, should control the issue.1 4
Another approach, often applied in similar situations, would treat the
problem as a question of title to the negotiable instruments as chattels.1"
Under this doctrine, the drawee bank may debit the drawer's account when
it hag paid to a holder intended by the drawer or to a person who has
acquired bona fide title-under the Negotiable Instruments Law.( The problem
is whether the recipient of the money had title at the time of the transfer,
and this should be determined by application of the lex res sitae.17 When
the check is payable to a fictitious person, title is passed by a mere delivery
if it is considered a bearer instrument; but if the check is deemed an order
instrument, a valid endorsement is necessary and a forgery will not pass
title.18 Since the transfers in the instant case occurred in Illinois, when the
dishonest employee deposited the checks, it may be argued that the law of
that state governs the validity of these transfers, and since the checks are
bearer instruments under Illinois law, their delivery to the Illinois banks
passed good title and the drawees could legitimately debit the drawer's ac-
counts. While this type of analysis may be no less arbitrary than the approach
in contractual terms, it apparently affords a more tangible basis for decision
in situations complicated by an abundance of implied contracts. That this
analysis may lead to highly artificial results, however, is illustrated by the
case where one of the fictitious payee checks was deposited for collection
and the other cashed immediately.19 It might be argued under one line of
authorities that when the check is left for collection the forwarding bank
acts as the agent of the depositor, 0 and title is passed not in Illinois, but
in New York. Therefore the transfer of title must be governed by New
York law. But if the bank paid out directly to the depositor, it became the
13. 2 BEALE, CoNFLIcr OF LAws (1935) 1268 et seq.
14. See cases cited in LORENZEN, CASES ON CONtacr OF LAWS (4th ed. 1937) 547,
n. 73; Lorenzen and Heilman, The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws (1935) 83 U.
OF PA. L. REv. 555, 575; Comment (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 803. Although the location
of the drawer at the time he draws a particular check may often be fortuitous, the
location of the drawee is constant. See Buschmann, op. cit. supra note 6, at 222.
15. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927) 363-4; Comment (1931) 17 VA. L. Rsv.
493.
16. LoaNzm, Co-NLCr OF LAWS RELATING TO BILLS AND NOTES (1919) 47.
17. U. S. v. Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y., 293 U. S. 340, 95 A. L. R. 651 (1934);
Embiricos v. Anglo-Austrian Bank (C. A.) [1905] 1 K. B. 677; Weissman v. Banque
de Bruxelles, 254 N. Y. 488, 173 N. E. 835 (1930). RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT or LAWS
(1934) § 349.
18. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW ANNOTATED (5th ed. 1932) §§ 30, 23.
19. The opinion in the principal case is silent as to the depositor's exact procedure.
Most of the memoranda submitted to the court state that the checks were deposited for
collection. Defendant's memorandum in the Central Hanover Bank & Trust case, supra
note 5, however, states (p. 2) that one of the checks was deposited for collection in'one
Illinois bank and the other was cashed at another Illinois bank.
20. Weissman v. Banque de Bruxelles, 254 N. Y. 488, 173 N. E. 835 (1930).
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purchaser 21 and title was transferred in Illinois. The result would be
to protect the New York bank when the Illinois bank acted as "purchaser"
but to deprive it of protection when it acted as "agent." This distinction would
be unrealistic since the Illinois bank, after having collected the proceeds,
paid them over to the dishonest employee.
The more fundamental problem suggested by the instant case is the proper
allocation of the risk of losses upon fictitious payee checks. Between bank
and large scale employer, there is little preference on the basis of ability to
insure: banks may and do insure against such losses; business enterprises
sometimes secure fidelity insurance. The real problem is whether vicarious
liability should be expanded to include employer responsibility for the em-
ployee's personal fraud2 or whether the traditional liability of banks for
payments on forgeries should be extended to all fictitious payee checks. "
Intrastate dealings may consistently be governed by local policy. But where
interstate transactions are complicated by divergent attitudes, courts may, by
the skillful manipulation of conflict of laws concepts, individualize each case
and allot the risk in their discretion.2 4
MISMANAGEMENT CLAI.IS I- RAILROAD REORGANIZATIONS*
REORGANIZATION of a railroad or other large enterprise affords a signal
opportunity to scrutinize the conduct of a normally self-perpetuating manage-
ment,' and to determine whether executives are fit to retain their positions.
Receivers and trustees, as officers of the court, have always been charged
with a duty to make investigations, uncover previous acts of mismanagement,
and prosecute the culprits for the benefit of the estate.2 Section 77 of the
21. See Equitable Trust Co. v. Roehling, 275 U. S. 248, 25.2; Turner, Deposit of
Demand Paper as "Purchases" (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 874.
22. Corporate structure, especially when there is complicated departmentalization,
multiplies opportunities for the kind of fraud that occurred in this case. Since the
employee is usually defrauding his employer and acting beyond the scope of his author-
ity, it is a mere legalism to impute his knowledge to the drawer-employer. However,
the policy of encouraging free negotiability and the employer's pusition of control may
well militate in favor of increased liability.
23. (1933) 3 BRooKLYN L. RE'. 121; (1933) 27 ILL L. REV. 564. The imputation
of knowledge is usually so artificial and fortuitous that convenience may better be
served by holding the bank liable indiscriminately.
24. See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem (1933) 47 HAnv. L.
RE%% 173.
* Lonsdale v. Speyer (five cases), 249 App. Div. 127 el seq., 291 X. Y. Supp. 490
d seq. (1936).
1. For a study of the difficulties encountered in attempting to oust an intrenched
management, see BERLE AND .MEANs. THE MotN'a COrFLsTION AND PRIVATE Prop-
ERTY (1932).
2. See Dodd, Reorganization 7hrnueqh Bankrutlcy: .A Reiwdy for Wlhat? (1935)
48 HARV. L. RE. 1100, 1114.
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Bankruptcy Act,a sought, as one of its objectives, to vitalize this purgatory
power, which had rarely been exercised by the equity receiver.
Before resorting to the equity receivership, railroad executives usually
created an atmosphere in which impending financial difficulties were made to
appear as temporary setbacks encountered by an unfortunate management
whose honesty and ability were unquestioned. To assist the company in
consummating a reorganization with the least possible embarrassment, a
sympathetic federal judge was usually prevailed upon to appoint a corporate
official as receiver.4 When this early practice was criticized as incompatible
with the 'high trust impressed upon an officer of the court, reorganizers found
it expedient to inject a degree of impartiality into the proceedings by the
selection of an additional independent receiver.5 In actuality, however, the
independent held a merely formal position; his reputation lent dignity to the
receivership, but the scope of his activity was narrowly circumscribed.0 He
had little personal knowledge of the corporation's affairs, and in view of the
friendly nature of the proceedings, it is probable that he did not feel bound
to conduct an inquiry into any but the most flagrant abuses, for the attendant
publicity would have impeded reorganization by destroying the faith of the
security-holders. Moreover, the pervasive control of the banker-management
group7 over the receivership process made difficult any investigation of their
stewardship, even were the independent so inclined.
Section 77, which replaces the receiver with a trustee, is the first legislative
attempt to set standards governing 'his selection. Trustees are now appointed
by the bankruptcy court, subject to the approval of the Interstate Commerce
Commission.8 Since efficient maintenance of the property as a going concern
requires knowledge .of the problems and personnel of the enterprise, the stat-
ute permits nomination of a corporate officer, but an outsider, free from
management affiliations, must be named to serve with him.0 Maximum limits
of compensation are fixed by the Commission.10 In almost every case involv-
3. 49 STAT. 911 (1935), 11 U. S. C. § 205 (Supp. 1936).
-4. For a description of the procedure employed, see LOWENTHAL, TuE INvEsToR
PAYS (1933) 111 et seq.
5. See Cravath, The Reorganization of Corporations, in SomtE LEGAL PHASES OF
CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION (1917) 153, 160.
6. See a description of the Milwaukee receivers (1926-28) in LOWVENTIIAL, Op. it.
supra note 4, at 120-130.
7. See Comment (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 229.
8. § 77 c (1). Section 77 as originally enacted [47 STAT. 1474 (1933) 11 U. S. C.
§ 205 (1934)], provided that the court should select the trustees from a panel chosen
by the Commission. This method, however, was found impractical. See (1937) 46 YAuX
L. J. 1247, 1249.
For a suggestion that Commission ratification of a judicial appointment is perhaps
unconstitutional, see Friendly, Amendinent of the Railroad Reorganization Act (1936)
36 COL. L. REv. 27, 40; (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1247, 1249.
9. In the case of a railroad whose operating revenues are less than $1,000,000 per
year, the independent trustee is not required. § 77 c (1).
10. § 77 c (2). Fees have been greatly reduced. Three trustees for the Milwaukee
are limited to a combined total of $61,000 per year, as compared to the $260,000 received
annually by the three equity receivers of the same company for 1926-28. The results
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ing Class I property, the railroad president and an independent have been
chosen.'
It is difficult to evaluate the effect of 77 upon the utility of the independent
trustee. Some activity is indicated by the two mismanagement suits which
trustees have brought to date against officers, directors and bankers of the
St. Louis-San Francisco' 2 and the Missouri Pacific.13 Neither of these cases,
however, can definitely be ascribed to any change wrought by the new statute.
The Frisco had been put into receivership prior to its filing under 77. As
a result of procedural complications occasioned by unfriendly suits brought
in both state and federal courts prior to the friendly receivership, an outside
receiver acceptable to the hostile interests had been selected to serve alongside
the president of the railroad. 14 Both receivers have been retained as trustees
under 77, and the unfriendly officer is responsible for the present litigation."3
In the second action, which alleges improper transactions by the management
group of the Missouri Pacific, the complaint has been but recently filed, and
little is known about the background of the controversy.
Aside from suits brought by independent trustees other methods have been
used to obtain retribution from an unfaithful management. Security holders
have compelled prosecution of the more flagrant cases10 Bondholders and
stockholders of the Frisco instituted no less than five mismanagement suits,
several of which were instrumental in precipitating reorganization and ob-
taining the appointment of a hostile receiver. The Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, intervening as a secured creditor, succeeded in persuading the
bankruptcy court to order that the trustee of the Missouri Pacific bring an
action for recovery of payments made under the notorious Terminal Shares
contract.' 7 Other government agencies have been enlisted to uncover hitherto
unrevealed improprieties. The 1935 amendments to Section 77 authorized
achieved by the Commission may be contrasted with the failure of prior attempts to
control expenses. See Comment (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 974.
11. In at least four instances, three trustees have been selected.
12. Lonsdale v. Speyer (five cases) 249 App. Div. 127 ct seq., 291 N. Y. Supp.
490 et seq. (1936).
13. In April, 1937, Guy A. Thompson, the trustee, filed suit in the Common Pleas
Court of Cleveland against five directors and 0. P. Van Sweringen's estate, alleging
improper manipulation of the company's securities and misuse of funds. See (1937)
144 Comm,. & FiN. CHRon. 2836.
14. For a description of the events leading up to the Frisco receivership, see
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE CommIssIoN, REPORT ON PRoTcTiE AND REonoGA:IZATl..;
ComamnEzs (1937) Part I, 265-274.
15. The Frisco controversy is based upon allegedly improper purchases of stock of
the Rock Island and of the Gulf, Mobile and Northern. For a summary of the trans-
actions, see S. E. C. REPoRT, op. cit. supra note 14, Part II, 32-64; St. Louis-S. F. Ry.
and Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Stock Acquisitions, 186 I. C. C. 137 (1932).
16. The legal aspects of management obligations, and the power of stockholders
and bondholders to bring mismanagement suits, are commented upon in S. R C. REtort,
op. cit. supra note 14, Part II, 22-31.
17- In re Missouri Pacific R. R., 13 F. Supp. SM (F D. M..o. 1935). The suit to
recover payments is still pending. A procedural puint was decided in Thimp,1n v.
Terminal Shares, Inc., 89 F. (2d) 652 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937), (1937) 4j YALL I. J. 1397.
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the court in its discretion to request investigations by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission,' 8 while congressional committees have been making in-
dependent inquiries. Meagre information at present available indicates that
more misdeeds will probably be discovered by vigorous investigatory com-
mittees than by the Commission, accustomed as the latter is to routine exam-
ination. Shortly after the Commission revealed to the court that it possessed
no information regarding mismanagement of the Missouri Pacific,19 hearings
conducted by the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee revealed several
questionable transactions .by executives of the same railroad. 20
But since suits by security holders and government investigations will occur
only sporadically, ultimate reliance must be placed upon the independent
trustee.21 Selection of at least one independent is now mandatory, but there
seems to be no statutory method of making him more competent than the
outside equity receiver whom he replaces. 77's only innovation along this line
is the requirement of Commission approval of all appointments, and the Com-
mission's imprimatur has been placed upon almost all of the court's nominees. 22
Whether or not this precaution has improved the caliber of trustees, more
has probably been accomplished by other provisions of 77 calculated to dimin-
ish banker-management control of the reorganization, 23 and by the stimula-
tion of aroused investor opinion.24 And while combined efforts of investors,
public agencies and carefully selected trustees have resulted in few misman-
agement suits, this fact is of little significance in appraising the utility of
present methods, for it is possible that in most cases no basis for such suits
exists. The main value of investigation lies not in the assets recovered, but
in the corrective influence of vigorous policing upon an intrenched manage-
ment.
18. § 77c(9).
19. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (1936) 46.
20. The Committee's investigation of railroad reorganizations began on Oct. 20
(N. Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1937, p. 33, col. 1), and revelations have been made inter-
mittently from that time. See, e.g., N. Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1937, p. 33, col. 1.
21. The concentration of power in Commission and trustee may have a backwash
effect of preventing other types of suits for mismanagement. In Meyer v. Kansas City
So. Ry., 84 F. (2d) 411 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), (1936) 36 Co. L. Rav. 1170, a derivative
suit brought by a stockholder against bankers, officers and other railroads for misman-
agement of the St. Louls-Southwestern, the customary appointment of a receiver was
requested. The bill was dismissed on the ground, inter alia, that no receiver need be
appointed, since it was already the duty of the railroad's trustee under Section 77 to
investigate mismanagement claims. So far as is known, however, the trustee has
brought no suit.
22. But cf. N. Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1937, p. 39, col. 4, reporting the Commission's
refusal to ratify the appointment of a second trustee for the N. Y., Ontario and Western,
on grounds of economy.
23. See Comment (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 247, 250.
24. A group of vociferous small investors headed by Prof. Charles A. Beard was
instrumental in precipitating the current Congressional investigation of the Missouri
Pacific's finances. See Hearings before Committee on Interstate Consmerce on S. Res.
7, 74th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1935) 2-38.
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JURISDICTION OF S. E. C. OVER SECURITY ISSUE OF A CORPORATION
TEMPORARILY EXEMPTED UNDER PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT*
THE PUBLIC Utility Holding Company Act of 19351 requires the Securities
and Exchange Commission to exempt from its prohibitions and supervision
those holding companies whose structure and activity comply with certain
requirements, unless contrary to public interest.2 The filing of an applica-
tion for exemption in good faith by a non registered company automatically
exempts the applicant until the Commission has acted upon its petition.3 But
a temporarily exempted company is faced with a perplexing problem, well
illustrated in a recent case, if it embarks upon a course of action which may
be subject to Commission approval should the Commission declare it regis-
terable.4 An application for a permanent exemption was filed by the Inter-
national Paper and Power Company. Before it had been passed upon, the
Company decided to reorganize its capital structure by a plan which included
the issuance of warrants to purchase common stock and preferred stock con-
vertible into common. But as the Commission might decide that the Company
comes within the Act before the common stock is issued and as its issuance
might then be subject to approval by the Commission, the present value of
the warrants and conversion rights would be impaired. The Company took
what appeared to be the safest course: it applied to the Commission for help.
Its petition raised an interesting administrative problem, which the Com-
mission proceeded to resolve by permitting the Company, for the purposes
of this issue, to act as much like a registered company as possible. The
Company applied for, and the Commission issued, a report "in the manner
provided in Section 11(g) (2)," 5 this being the procedure required of regis-
tered companies proposing reorganization to their stockholders.0  The plan
having been accepted by the stockholders, the Commission exempted the issue
from the necessity of approval under Section 7, which sets the standards for
*In the Matter of the Application of International Paper & Power Co., S. F_. C.
Release No. 642 (Holding Company Act) May 5, 1937, rehearing denied, S.E.C.
Release No. 850 (Holding Company Act) Oct. 13, 1937.
1. 49 STAT. 803 (1935), 15 U. S. C. §79 (Supp. 1936). For a discussion of the
problems giving rise to the Act and the Act itself, see Buchanan, The Public Utility
Holding Company Problem (1937) 25 CALIF. L. REV. 517; Comment (1936) 45 YALE
L. J. 468:
2. 49 STAT. 810 (1935), 15 U. S. C. §79c(a) (Supp. 1936); Cf. 49 STAT. 806
(1935), 15 U. S. C. §79b(7) (Supp. 1936).
3. 49 STAT. 811 (1935), 15 U. S. C. §79c(c) (Supp. 1936).
4. In the Matter of the Application of International Paper & Power Co., S.E.C.
Release No. 642 (Holding Company Act), May 5. 1937. The -ame problem may arise
with respect to a permanent exemption which may be terminated by the Commission.
PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 1935, §3C, 49 STAT. 811 (1935), 15
U. S. C. § 79c(c) (Supp. 1936) ; cf. §2(7), 49 STAT. 806 (1935). 15 U. S. C. §79b(7)
(Supp. 1936).
5. The plan is carefully analyzed in Report on Reortanikation Plan for Inter-
national Paper & Power Co., S E. C. Release No. 641 (tolding Company Act)
May 5, 1937.
6. 49 STAT. 823 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79k(g) (Supp. 1936).
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securities of registered companies.1 An order was issued exempting the
Company, insofar as this issue was concerned, from Section 4(a), which for-
bids unregistered holding companies to distribute securities in interstate
commerce,8 from Section 6(a), which similarly restricts registered companies
unless Section 7 has been satisfied,9 and from all other applicable sections
of the Act.10
Several alternatives were available to both the Company and the Coln-
mission. The Company might have withdrawn its application for permanent
exemption and registered. But as the Act expressly gives it the privilege
of enjoying a temporary exemption until its claim is determined, it felt no
duty to accept the other burdens of the Act. Conversely, the Commission
might have passed upon the application for exemption immediately. But this
procedure would have defeated the Commission's policy of subjecting such
applications to careful scrutiny, both because in this manner only could the
true nature of the Company's position be discovered and because the Coin-
mission does not wish to invite legal attack upon the constitutionality of the
Act by precipitate action. The Company could, of course, have proceeded
without Commission approval. It might have relied upon the argument that
the common stock issued to meet the conversion rights and warrants is so
closely identified with the conversion rights and warrants that it is to be
deemed issued, for the purposes of the Act, when they are issued.1 Further-
more, it is arguable that from Section 6(b), which exempts from the Act
stock issued to meet obligations outstanding on January 1, 1935, may be im-
plied an intent to exempt all stock issued to meet obligations incurred prior
to registration. 1
2
This independent action, or some other method of recapitalization. would
appear to be the only course permitted by the Act in this situation. The
Commission is given jurisdiction over registered companies and jurisdiction
to determine whether or not a particular company need register. Since the
International Paper and Power Company cannot claim the former, the Com-
mission's power over the Company must result from the latter or not at all.
But as the power of an administrative tribunal finds its outermost bounds
in the limits of the statute conferring jurisdiction,"3 and as the Act gives
the Commission jurisdiction over those claiming exemption only in order to
determine their status, it is difficult to see how a power to aid can be spelled
7. 49 STAT. 815 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79g (Supp. 1936).
8. 49 STAT. 812 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79d(a) (Supp. 1936).
9. 49 STAT. 814 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79f(a) (Supp. 1936).
10. In the Matter of the Application of International Paper & Power Co., S. E. C.
Release No. 770 (Holding Company Act) Aug. 3, 1937, rehearing denied, S. E. C.
Release No. 850 (Holding Company Act) Oct. 13, 1937.
11. See In the Matter of the Application of International Paper & Power Co.,
S. E. C. Release No. 642 (Holding Company Act), May 5, 1937, at 8 (concurring
opinion of Commissioner Douglas).
12. 49 STAT. 814 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79f(b) (Supp. 1936).
13. Merritt v. Welsh, 104 U. S. 694 (1881): United States v. United Verde
Copper Co., 196 U. S. 207 (1905); Waite v. Macy, 246 U. S. 606 (1918); cf. Crowell
v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932).
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out of the jurisdiction to exempt. In fact, it can hardly be doubted but that
the language of the statute, taken baldly, affords no basis for the Com-
mission's action. But this conclusion leads to harsh effects. Action without
Commission sanction is dangerous, 14 and strict interpretation of the Act
would compel cautious companies temporarily exempt not to recapitalize
in this way, a compulsion stemming from no express provision of the
statute. Furthermore, only if the application for exemption is filed in good
faith, is the Company entitled to temporary exemption, and the Act makes
no provision for a separate determination of this requirement.
Basing its jurisdiction on the assumption that the temporary exemption
was unintentionally incomplete, the Commission searched for means within
the Act to fill what it considered a hiatus in the Act. This power it found
by reading Section 20(a), which authorizes it to issue "such rules and
regulations and such orders as it may deem necessary to carry out the
provisions of this title . . .,"15 with Section 3(c), permitting tempurary
exemption. The Commission was careful to make the issuance of its order
conditional upon compliance with Sections 11(g) and 7, thus retaining con-
trol over the plan. And in issuing the order it declared the Company
had done all a registered company would do in respect to this issue and
that the stock would in fact comply with the pertinent clauses of Section 7
when issued.'0 Inasmuch as the chief objectives of the Act are to integrate
the public utility system and to furnish some measure of protection to in-
vestors, it seems that from a practical point of view the Commission's action
fulfills the Act's intentions. Whether or not the Act intended that stock
issued pursuant to exempted warrants and conversion rights should also
be exempt, there would seem to be no Congressional intent to curtail the
issuance of stocks that do comply with the standards of Section 7.
There are, however, certain doctrinal difficulties in the rationale which
the Commission adopted. It has the power to exempt companies and sub-
sidiaries completely or partially, but it has no power to exempt a particular
issue, even one of a registered company, from the requirements of Section 7.
nor consequently from Section 6(a)."' As the Commission cannot exempt
a registered holding company's issues from the necessity for approval, a
14. The Company may be declared registerable. If it is, the Commission may
consider the stock as not having been issued when the warrants and conversion rights
were issued. And if the Commission makes this determination, it may hold that the
stock does not comply with Section 7.
15. 49 STAT. 833 (1935), 15 U. S. C. §79t(a) (Supp. 193b).
16. In the Matter of the Application of International Paper & Power Co., S. F C.
Release No. 770 (Holding Company Act), Aug. 3, 1937. Although the warra:nts and
conversion rights and the plan itself would as a matter of time be all exempt and
only the common stock contingently subject to Section 7, it is apparent fr,=m the
Section that compliance with its standards could only be discovered by pasing tin
the plan as well
17. Section 3(a), 49 STAT. 810 (1935), 15 U. S. C. §79c(a) (Supp. 193b) reads:
"The Commission . . . shalt exempt any holding company . . . from any provision
or provisions of this title . . ." But cf. In the Matter of the Kansas Electric Power
Co., S. E. C. Release No. 486 (Holding Company Act), Dec. 14, 1936, (1937) 46 YALE
L. J. 1058.
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fortiori it would seem to have no power to exempt the issue of an unreg-
istered company which has consented to assume the burdens of a registered
company. As long as the Commission felt that it could not grant its ap-
proval, it would perhaps have been better for it to stop short of subjecting
its action to such objection. It could have proceeded precisely as it did,
but instead of issuing the order it might have merely advised the Company
that, were the issue at some future date to become subject to Section 7,
it would meet the Section's requirements. Such action would not consti-
tute a reviewable order,"' and the company would have some measure of
protection for the Commission probably would not reverse its position after
the Company had acted in reliance upon it. This quasi-estoppel may in the
last analysis be all the protection the Company has received under the
present ruling. For should the Commission declare the Company register-
able, and should the order be declared void by the courts- a matter which
may depend upon the existence of one with sufficient interest to contest the
order,19 the Commission will probably not deny its approval under Section
7 contrary to its present declaration. 20
EFFECT OF EXECUTIvE AGREEMENT ON THE STATUS OF
CONFISCATION DECREES*
IN THE exchange of diplomatic correspondence between the United States
and Russia which accorded recognition to Soviet Russia, an assignment was
made by Russia to the United States of all claims against American nationals
held by the Soviet Government.1 On the basis of this assignment, the United
States brought suit to recover a deposit made prior to 1918 with the Bel-
mont Bank of New York by a Russian corporation which had been dis-
solved and whose assets had been confiscated under Soviet decree. The
18. Section 24(a), 49 STAT. 834 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79x(a) (Supp. 1936) pro-
viding for review, reads: "Any person or party aggrieved by an order issued by the
Commission . . .may obtain a review of such order in the circuit court of appeals
." This would not be an order. And injunctions have traditionally been granted
qnly where the administrative body makes or threatens more affirmative action. Spiel-
man Motor Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S. 89 (1935), Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908) ;
see Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 324 (1935); cf. Ex parle
La Prade, 289 U. S. 444 (1933).
19. On Sept. 11, 1937, a stockholder filed a petition for review with the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. But it is difficult to see how he has been
injured by the order. For the stock could be issued whether the company were either
exempt or registered since it complies with the requirements of the Act,
20. The Commission may have had some such consideration in mind when an
application for rehearing was denied. In the Matter of the Application of International
Paper & Power Co., S. E. C. Release No. 850 (Holding Company Act) Oct. 13, 1937.
*United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324 (1937). Stone, Brandeis, and Cardozo
concurred specially.
1. See (1934) 28 Am. J. INT. L. No. 1, Official Documents, at 10.
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District Court's decree dismissing the complaint for failure to state facts
constituting a cause of action, affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals,2
was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States.3
This decision is apparently the first to hold that the Soviet decrees might
affect property situated outside of Russia at the time of enactment. Although
it has been conceded that a sovereign state's confiscation of private property
within its own jurisdiction will be recognized by courts of other countriesP4
it has been held consistently that confiscatory legislation will be granted no
extraterritorial effect. 5 In all previous cases the reason for refusing to give
effect to Soviet decrees has been their opposition to the public policy of the
forum, to which the comity ordinarily granted foreign laws must yield.0
But the majority in the instant case reversed the lower court, which had
based its decision on state public policy, upon the ground that an international
compact overrides local laws and policies. If the agreement involved had
been a treaty, made with the advice and consent of the Senate, there is little
doubt but that it could override state law or state policy,7 for a treaty is
2. United States v. Belmont, 85 F. (2d) 542 (C.C. A. 2d, 1936), (1936) 36 CoI.
L. REv. 1160, (1936) 5 Gao. WASH. L Ray. 120.
3. United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S, 324 (1937) (Stone, Brandeis, and Cardozo
concurring). For discussions of this case, see Borchard, Confiscatlons: Extraterritorial
and Domestic (1937) 31 Am. J. Ir. L 675; Jessup, The Liftinoff Assignmtnt and
the Belmont Case (1937) 31 Am. J. INT. L. 481; (1937) 51 HW. L REy. 162; (1937)
23 'VA. L. Rsv. 955.
4. Banque de France v. Equitable Trust Co., 33 F. (2d) 202 (S. D. N.Y. 1929);
Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N. Y. 220, 186 N. E. 679 (1933) ; cf. Dougherty
v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 266 N. Y. 71, 193 N. E. 897
(1934) ; Bank of Ethiopia v. National Bank of Egypt and Liguori, [1937] 3 All E. R. &
In some cases the decisions have been unnecessarily based on the idea that recognition
gave retroactive validation to these acts. See Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246
U. S. 297, 303 (1918); Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U. S. 304, 309 (1918);
Terrazas v. Holmes, 225 S. V. 848, 852 (Te. Civ. App. 1920); Luther v. Sagor
[1921] 3 K. B. 532, 544; Borchard, The Unrecogni.ed Government its American Courts
(1932) 26 Am. J. INT. L. 261, 268-271.
5. Sokoloff v. National City Bank of New York, 239 N. Y. 158, 145 N. E. 917
(1924); Petrogradsky Mejdunarodny Kommerchesky Bank v. National City Bank of
New York, 253 N. Y. 23, 170 N. E. 479 (1930); cf. Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stod-
dard, 240 N. Y. 149, 147 N. E. 703 (1925). Cases after recognition have also refused
effect. Vladikavkazsky Ry. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N. Y. 369, 189 N. E. 456
(1934). The foreign cases have been collected in Nebolsine, The Recovery of the
Foreign Assets of Nationali:ed Russian Corporations (1930) 39 YA.E L J. 1130;
,Vohl, Nationalication of Joint Stock Banking Corporations in Soviet Russia and its
Bearing on Their Legal Status Abroad (1927) 75 U. PA. L Rv. 385, 527, 622.
6. See Vladikavkazsky Ry. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N. Y. 369, 378, 189 N. E.
456, 460 (1934); Connick, The Effect of Soviet Decrees in American Courts (1925)
34 YALE L. J. 499; Fraenkel, The Juristic Status of Foreign Slates, Their Property,
and Their Acts (1925) 25 COL. L Ray. 544, 564; Habicht, The Application of Soviet
Laws and the Exception of Public Order (1927) 21 Am. J. 1:-.r. L 238.
7. Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199 (U. S. 1796); Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259
(U. S. 1817); Hauenstein v. Lynham. 100 U. S. 483 (1879); see CRANDALL. TnrxAvrEs,
THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT (2d ed. 1916) 247-250.
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"the supreme law of the land." But even the treaty power, though un-
limited by any provision of the Constitution, has its bounds; for courts and
writers have intimated that a clearly colorable use of this power to effect
a result opposed to other terms of the Constitution would be held invalidY
The status of an executive agreement made without congressional author-
ization or senatorial ratification, such as that involved in the instant case,
is not so certain. Although there is no clause in the Constitution which
directly confers upon the executive the power to make international agree-
ments without the advice and consent of the Senate, a tradition, which has
never been questioned, has long given him the power to do so in certain
situations,'0 such as those involving the settlement of claims of United States
citizens against foreign governments, or of private claims." By implication
at least, the instant case confirms the executive's power to make these com-
pacts' 2 and at the same time holds that they are to have the same force as
treaties in their supremacy over state law or policy. There is no suggestion,
however, that executive agreements are to be permitted to override other
provisions of the Constitution, for the reversal is without prejudice to claims
of creditors based upon federal policy. This result may be desirable in pre-
venting the states from embarrassing American relations with Russia by
their refusal to recognize Soviet title because of emotional antipathy toward
confiscation, but it is open to several objections. First, since the executive
agreement did not specifically approve the confiscatory decrees, there would
seem to be no federal policy to override state laws. And secondly, it is
doubtful whether the Russian decrees purported to extend to property
abroad ;13 or if they did, whether the assignment itself was intended to cover
claims acquired by confiscation. 14
8. U. S. CONST. ART. VI, cl. 2.
9. See Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258, 266-267 (1890) ; In re Beale, 2 Fed. Supp.
899, 901 (D. Minn. 1933), aff'd, 71 F. (2d) 737 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934); TUCKER, LImTA-
TIONS ON THE TREATY-MAKING-PwER (1915) 420. But the Tenth Amendment is not
regarded as such a limitation. Missouri v. Holla:d, 252 U. S. 416 (1920).
10. See COaWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RLATioNs (1917) 116-125;
CRANDALL, op. cit. supra note 7, at 102-140; Barnett, International Agreements with-
out the Advice and Consent of the Senate (1905) 15 YALE L. J. 18, 63; Moore, Treaties
and Executive Agreements (1905) 20 PoL. Sci. Q. 385; Comment (1937) 46 YALE
L. J. 647, 660.
11. CORWIN, op. cit. supra note 10, at 119; CRANDALL, Op. cit. supra note 7, at
108; 5 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST (1906) §752.
12. The exercise of the Presidential power to make foreign agreements as author-
ized under an act of Congress has been challenged, on the ground that there has been
an improper delegation of power. Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892). But the
examination will not be as strict as in regard to a delegation of power over internal
matters. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 315-316
(1936).
13. Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 161 Misc. 903,
294 N. Y. Supp. 648 (Sup. Ct. 1937); The Jupiter (No. 3) [1927] P. 122, aff'd,
[1927] P. 250. But cf. United States v. Belmont, 85 F. (2d) 542 (C. C. A. ad, 1936).




The concurring judges arrived at the same result by another approach,
which is interesting as a first attempt in this country to limit the content
of public policy with reference to foreign confiscation decrees. Since the
substance of public policy has seldom been defined, it has been recognized
that unless checked it may be applied destructively to interfere with tile
normal play of private international law. Consequently, various rules have
been formulated to limit its application in certain type situations.t 5 In this
case, the Circuit Court of Appeals based its refusal to recognize the validity
of the confiscation decrees upon the often-voiced public policy of New York
against such decrees.10 The concurring justices in the Supreme Court, in
reversing the order, intimated, however, that a moral distaste for confiscatory
legislation is not sufficient reason for denying effect to a foreign confiscation
decree.17 An affirmative desire to further some practical purpose seems to
be necessary before a court may refuse to recognize the decrees, the minority
suggesting that the intervention of other claimants, who were lacking in the
instant case, would be adequate cause for invoking a public policy, state
or federal, against them.18 While this opinion, therefore, seems contrary
to a long line of American cases, it is distinguishable: for in all previous
ca-es the claims of creditors.' 9 stockholders.2- or directors -" were furthered
I)- refusal to recognize the Soviet decrees. In the instant case the decrees
were invoked in an attempt to defeat Soviet title w\hen no conflicting claims
of cr-ditors were involved.-'
.khough the majority and minority are in accord as to the decision on
the narrow question presellted in thi. case, the dissimilarity of approach in
I5. See Lorenzen. Territoriality. Pulic Pediy and the Conifliet of Laws (1924)
33 YALE L. J. 736: Comment (1936) 45 YALE L J. 140.3. l4tj7.
16. See cases cited notes 5 and 6. supra. The Lourt also suggested that the Fifth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution expressed a policy oplitsed to such claims. See
United States v. Belmont. 85 F. (2d) 542. 544 (C. C.A. 2d, 1936)
17. Both the majority and the concurring opinion hold that there is no p .licy to
protect the debtor from paying his debt. his interest being merely that of a custoidian.
See United States v. Belmont. 301 U. S. 324. 332 and 334 (0937).
18. The Government attempted to get arond the situs rule biv arguing that while
New York law might govern the debtor's duty to pay, Russian law determined the
creditor's right to receive. Brief for the United States. pp. Wo-32. United States v.
Belmont. 301 U. S. 324 (1937). The Court d,.es not discuss thls argument. But this
point was decided adversely to the government in 'Muscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of
New York & Trust Co.. 161 Misc. 903. 294 N. Y. Supp. (48 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
19. James & Co. v. Second Russian Insurance Co., 239 N. Y. 248, 14ti N. F_.
39 (1925).
20. _Moscow Fire Insurance Co. v. Bank of New York & Trust Co.. 161 Misc.
903, 294 N. Y. Supp. 648 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
21. Joint Stock Co. of Volgakama Oil & Chem. Factory v. National City Bank,
240 N. Y. 368. 148 N. E. 552 (1925): Petrogradsky .Mejdunarodny Kommerchesky
Bank v- National City Bank of New York. 253 X. Y. 23. 170 N. E. 479 (1930). dis-
tinguisling. Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard. 240 N. Y. 149. 147 X. E. 703 (1925).
22. The Court was cognizant of the fact that some might later appear, for it had
denied shortly before a motion to intervene made by a New York receiver. United
States v. Belmont, 300 U. S. 641 (1937) No. 532.
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each opinion presages future disagreement when creditors and stockholders
of the dissolved corporation intervene. The majority's rationalization depends
on the subordination of state policy to the national policy enunciated in the
executive agreement. Thus the Federal Constitution is the sole basis upon
which a claimant may attack the confiscation decrees. And it would seem
from the majority's ambiguous statement that the Constitution has no extra-
territorial effect except for American nationals,2 that the latter only are
protected by the Fifth Amendment. Foreign creditors and stockholders, un-
able to invoke the Amendment, will be remediless. Under the view of the
concurring judges, however, the status of intervenors will depend upon the
public policy expressed in the New York statute providing for the distri-
bution of assets of nationalized corporations to creditors and stockholders, 24
and consequently both American and foreign creditors and stockholders may
present claims based thereon. And it would seem possible that in the
absence of a statute or of creditors and stockholders, the state itself, under
the common law doctrine of escheat,25 might have a sufficient interest upon
which to base a policy opposed to recognition of Soviet title.
JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS UNDER BLUE SKY LAWS *
A COLORADO corporation, which had complied with the requirements of the
Minnesota blue sky law, sold stock in Minnesota to the plaintiffs. Alleging
a conspiracy to denude the corporation of its assets, the plaintiffs brought
suit in Minnesota for an accounting and reconveyance of assets. Personal
service was had upon both the individual defendants and the corporation to
which the assets had allegedly been transferred. An attempt was made to
obtain jurisdiction over the Colorado corporation by use of the substituted
service provision of the blue sky law. This section requires foreign corpora-
tions, as a prerequisite to selling stock in Minnesota, to appoint the chairman
of the securities commission as their agent for the purpose of accepting ser-
vice in all actions against the corporation "in relation to or involving any
transaction covered by this act."1 But -the Minnesota Supreme Court held,
one judge dissenting, that the lower court had not obtained jurisdiction over
the Colorado corporation since the action constituted affirmance of the con-
23. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324, 332 (1937).
24. N. Y. C. P. A. § 977(b). In spite of the fact that this statute specifically
states the Soviet decrees are not to be recognized, the concurring justices could find
no New York policy against recognizing them.
25. See FLETCHER, CoROATIoNs (perm. ed. 1931) §8586; (1937) 46 YALE L. 3.
878. But cf. Shayne v. Evening Post Publishing Co., 168 N. Y. 70, 61 N. E. 115
(1901).
* Zochrison v. Redemption Gold Corp., 274 N. W. 536 (Minn. 1937).
1. MIrN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 3996-11. Even where the substituted service pro-
visions do not expressly limit the type of action in which they may be used, courts have
interpreted them to be available only in actions arising under the blue sky laws.
Dragon Motor Car Co. v. Storrow, 165 Minn. 95, 205 N. W. 694 (1925).
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tract of sale and a waiver of the fraud upon which jurisdiction under the
statute is founded.&2
Since the plaintiffs wished to sue in Minnesota and since they had personal
jurisdiction over all save the defendant Colorado corporation, they could
have conceivably pursued one of several courses.2 A stockholder's suit for
reconveyance of assets might have been brought against the individual de-
fendants, who allegedly were responsible for fie fraud, and the transferee
corporation alone, on the theory that the corporation, although a party de-
fendant in such an action, is really the party suing and therefore need not be
ser-ed at alL4 As an alternative, plaintiffs might have attempted to obtain
jurisdiction over the Colorado corporation by serving the secretary of state
on the theory that the sale of securities in the state comes within the concept
of "doing business,"5 and that the corporation will therefore be deemed to
have appointed the agent required by statute whether or not it has done so
in fact.6
Rather than adopt one of these alternatives, the plaintiffs elected to join
the Colorado corporation as defendant and to obtain jurisdiction over it by
serving the chairman of the securities commission. This type of substituted
service is generally employed in suits where the purchaser of securities seeks
damages7 or recission of the contract and recovery of the consideration8
2. Zochrison v. Redemption Gold Corp., 274 N. W. 536 (Minn. 1937).
3. If the plaintiffs had desired to recover a money judgment, they could have sued
the Colorado corporation in Minnesota for damages or rescission, obtaining jurisdiction
over the Colorado corporation by substituted service under the Minnesota blue sky
law. Supplemental thereto, they might have brought a creditor's bill against the
fraudulent transferee to insure that sufficient assets would be restored to the defendant
to meet their claims. Nye Odorless Incinerator Corp. v. Nye Odorless Crematory Co.,
18 Del. Ch. 179, 156 AtI. 176 (1931); see ARNOLD AND JAZsES, CASES or. TRIA s, JuDG-
MENTS AND ApPFAns (1936) 501.
4. Wilson v. American Palace Car Co., 64 N. J. Eq. 534, 54 AtI. 415 (Ch. 1903);
Guggenheimer v. Beaver Board Cos., 136 Misc. 511, 240 N. Y. Supp. 15 (1930), affd,
229 App. Div. 717, 241 N. Y. Supp. 877 (1st Dep't 1930); Marco v. H. M. Byllesby &
Co., 241 App. Div. 714, 269 N.Y. Supp. 1002 (1st Dep't 1934) ; see Glenn, The Stock-
holder's Suit (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 580; Winer, Jurisdiction over the Beneficiary Cor-
poration in Stockholders' Suits (1935) 22 VA. L. Ruv. 153.
5. "Doing business" has been so interpreted by the Minnesota court. Atlinson v.
U. S. Operating Co., 129 Minn. 232, 152 N. W. 410 (1915) ; see Tauza v. Susquehanna
Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 267, 115 N. E. 915, 917 (1917); see Miu.s, FMlUDUWMiT
SECURITIEs (1925) 243. Contra: Sunrise Lumber Co. v. Biery Lumber Co., 195 App.
Div. 170, 185 N. Y. Supp. 711 (2d Dep't 1921); cf. Clews v. Woodstock Iron Co., 44
Fed. 31 (C. C. S. D. N. Y., 1890).
6. Washington v. Superior Court, 289 U. S. 361 (1933), affg, 169 Wash. 68, 15 P.
(2d) 660 (1932); Osage Oil & Refining Co. v. Inter-Pipe Co., 124 Okla. 7, 253 Pac. 66
(1926). Where, however, as may have occurred in the instant case, the cause of action
arose without the state, this device, in absence of an actual appointment of an agent
to be served, would probably not be successful Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass. of In-
dianapolis v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8 (1907); Simon v. Southern Ry., 235 U. S. 115
(1914).
7. Castle v. Acme Ice Cream Co., 101 Cal. App. 94, 281 Pac. 396 (1929) ; Churchill
v. St. George Development Co., 174 App. Div. 1, 160 N. Y. Supp. 357 (4th Dep't 1916).
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because of the seller's failure to comply with some provision of the blue
sky law. A few courts have, however, gone further and sustained substituted
service where the action was founded upon an affirmative misrepresentation
which was not in violation of any provision of the act.9 While the plaintiffs
in the instant case attempted to employ the substituted service provision to
support a cause of action and a prayer for relief which are novel in such
suits, this application of the provision appears to be well within the letter
as well as the spirit of the Minnesota blue sky law. The sole prerequisite to
jurisdiction is that the action relate to or involve a transaction covered by
that law. And the acts alleged by plaintiff-a failure to disclose a labor lien
in the registration statement filed with the Minnesota securities commis-
sion ° and a conspiracy to defraud the corporation of its assets by foreclos-
ing that lien"-were both subject to sanctions imposed by the Minnesota
statute. They would seem to be all that is necessary to confer jurisdiction.
The majority was swayed, however, more by the type of relief sought than
by the acts on which the claim for jurisdiction was based, and it gave no cate-
gorical answer to the question of whether the fraud alleged could support
the service upon the commissioner. The complaint was dismissed on the
ground that the plaintiffs' suit had the effect of affirming the original sale
of the securities and of waiving the fraud. Yet, as the dissenting justice
clearly points out, although affirmance of an executory contract entails waiver
of fraud,12 this result does not follow affirmance of an executed contract,13
such as the one involved in the instant case.
The majority was influenced by the fact that the relief sought was recon-
veyance of the assets to the defendant corporation. This should raise slight
conceptual difficulties. True, such relief is usually granted in stockholders'
suits where the plaintiff is not enforcing his own but the corporation's right.14
And, strictly speaking, the blue sky laws were intended to protect the pur-
8. Doherty v. Bartlett, 81 F. (2d) 920 (C. C. A. 1st, 1936); Gillis v. Pan American
Western Pet. Co., 34 P. (2d) 802 (Calif. App. 1934); Wheeler v. Wilkin, 58 P. (2d)
1223 (Calif. 1936).
9. Vogel v. Chase Securities Corp., 19 F. Supp. 564 (D. Minn. 1936); Kaiser v.
Butchart, 197 Minn. 28, 265 N. W. 826 (1936) ; cf. Dragon Motor Car Co. v. Storrow,
165 Minn. 95, 205 N. W. 694 (1925).
10. MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §§ 3996-8, 16, 19. Cf. Macdonald v. Roeth, 179
Cal. 194, 176 Pac. 38 (1918); Adkins v. Stewart, 159 Ky. 218, 166 S. W. 984 (1914);
Niles v. Yoakum, 179 App. Div. 75, 166 N. Y. Supp. 94 (1st Dep't 1917); Elliott v.
Clark, 157 S. W. 437 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
11. MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1936) § 3996-9. Since this provision was not
enacted until after these securities had been registered in Minnesota, there may be
doubt if it may be given a retroactive effect.
12. Simon v. Goodyear Metallic Rubber Shoe Co., 105 Fed. 573 (C. C. A. 6th,
1900) ; Schagun v. Scott Mfg. Co., 162 Fed. 209 (C. C. A. 8th, 1908) ; Kingman & Co.
v. Stoddard, 85 Fed. 740 (C. C. A. 7th, 1898); McDonough v. Williams, 77 Ark 261,
92 S. W. 783 (1905).
13. Stowe v. Mather, 234 Mich. 385, 208 N. V. 609 (1926) - Humphrey v. Sievers,
137 Minn. 373, 163 N. W. 737 (1917); Dawson v. Thuet Bros., 147 Minn. 429, 180
N. W. 534 (1920) ; Robinson v. Standard Stores, 52 R. I. 271, 160 Atl. 471 (1932).
14. See note 4, supra.
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chasers of stock and not the corporation. But this factor should not be con-
clusive in denying the plaintiffs the privilege of using substituted service:
by interpreting the complaint as one seeking to enforce the contract as rep-
resented, the plaintiffs may be said to be enforcing their own right, a right
which has been recognized by the issuance of injunctions restraining pro-
moters from enforcing against the corporation liens concealed when securi-
ties were sold to the public.15 Whatever the style in which the complaint may
be dressed, it is clear that the plaintiffs in this case were fundamentally
interested in protecting their own interests.
LIABILITY OF BANK FOR ADING F1 DuCmiy IN PL"RCHTSE OF
NON-LEGAL SECL-RITIES*
A RECENT New York case presents a novel application of the firmly-rooted
doctrine that anyone knowingly aiding or participating in a breach of trust
is jointly and severally' liable with the trustee.2 A-n administratrix, holding
as part of her husband's estate shares in the Bank of Italy and Bancitaly,
which were not in the statutory list of "legal" investments for fiduciaries,3
wished to take advantage of an offer of Transamerica Corporation to accept
those shares plus a cash consideration in exchange for shares in Transanerica.
The latter were likewise non-legals. In September, 1929, her attorney turned
in the certificates at a Bank of America office in New York, where a vice-
president. who was also a vice-president of Transamerica, had been desig-
nated to receive stock exchanged by Eastern holders. The head of the cus-
tomers" securities department of the bank. acting under general instructions
from the vice-president. 4 mailed the certificates to San Francisco, where
they were cancelled by Bank of Italy. and Transamerica certificates issued
in their stead. These were then sent back to Bank of America, which de-
livered them to the a'minitstratrix. Five years later, when the value of
15. Jones v. Bolles. Q Wa'!. 3t)4 (U. S. 1869); Given v. Times-Republican Printing
Co.. 114 Fed. 92 (C. C. A. 8th. 1902); Ritchie v. People's Telephone Co., 22 S. D. 593,
119 N. IV. 990 (1909): see cases cited 2 CoK ox Contom.Lroxs (8th Ed. 1923) 1284
It3.
*Stark v. National Cit" Ba:k A New Y.:,rk. 1-4 Mi-c. 51. 291 X. Y. Supp. 84
Sup. Ct. 1936 1.
1. Vance v. Kirk. 29 W. Va. 344. 1 S. E. 717 €187i: Bigth v. Faldgate. 113911
2. 4 BOGERT. TRus:- -:, T '7EEz t 193:.i §3,M: REsTATDIMNT. TnrsTs 1935)
3. N. Y. BAxctIxr L.k% , 123. as applied to administrators by X. Y. DEL EDT-r
EsTATE LAW § 111.
4. The letter offering the exchance advised Eastern stockholders to -send or
deliver their stock t., Cavaenaro. Vice-Pr.sident. Bank of America." Caragnaro ordered
the head of the cu.t.):mers' .securities- department to receive the stock to be exchanged.
and to have s..me receipts printed: -t is not clear far whom Cavagnaro professed to
be acting. Record on Appeal. 130. 157-175. 183-202. 463-164.
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these shares'had fallen to a fraction of their original value, the administratrix
brought suit against Transamerica and the National City Bank, successor to
Bank of America, to recover the loss sustained by the estate., The New
York Supreme Court awarded her judgments against both,6 on the ground
that the transaction was not merely an exchange, but an illegal investment
in which the defendants participated with knowledge of the plaintiff's fiduciary
capacity obtained from the application for exchange of the securities.
The court, emphasizing the cash payment and the differences both in
form and substance between the old corporations and Transamerica, 7 viewed
the transaction as one in which the administratrix had sold non-legals and
improperly purchased others with the proceeds.' In New York, where the
investment statute is construed as permissive rather than mandatory, an
acquisition of non-legals is not tortious. Nevertheless, it subjects the fiduciary
and any third parties who are found to have participated to a risk of absolute
liability for any loss from the investment, no matter what the cause. 10 If
the purchase was improper, Transamerica's liability as a participant seems
unavoidable. It sold the stock to the administratrix in her representative
capacity and knowingly"' received part of the trust res in violation of the
cestui's right that it should not be dissipated in non-legal investments.12 Ac-
5. Plaintiff's own liability would not bar her from suing in a representative
capacity. Wetmore v. Porter, 92 N. Y. 76 (1883).
6. Plaintiff and her son are the beneficiaries of the estate; as to her distributive
share, there might be an estoppel because she consented to the investment. See 4 BoGaRT,
TaUsrs AND TaUsTas (1935) § 941. Also, defendants probably have a right to appor-
tion the loss and sue her for contribution; see (1936) 3 U. or CHL L. REV. 675.
7. Transamerica, a holding company, was formed to acquire not only the shares
of Bank of Italy and Bancitaly, but also many other ventures. Cf. Mertz v. Guaranty
Trust Co., 247 N. Y. 137, 159 N. E. 888 (1928). Even where the trustee is directed
to retain certain non-legal securities, he cannot invest in holding company stocks offered
in exchange. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 113 N. 3. Eq. 299, 166 At. 528 (Ch. 1931).
8. Both Bank of America and Transamerica, however, might contend that they
had a right to assume that the plaintiff was mindful of her duty to dispose of any
non-legal stocks held by the estate within a reasonable time [In re Hamersley's Estate,
180 N. Y. Supp. 887 (Surr. Ct. 1920); Comment (1930) 79 U. or PA. L. REv. 77],
and that she made the exchange only to take advantage of the readier marketability
of Transamerica. Cf. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) §231(f). For purposes of dis-
cussing the general significance of the decision, however, this note will assume the
validity of the court's finding that there was a new illegal investment.
9. N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW §111 ("An executor, administrator, trustee
. may invest"). N. Y. DoMEsTic RELATIoNs LAW § 85, as recently amended, makes
the list mandatory for guardians. N. Y. Laws 1936, c. 848.
10. Delafield v. Barret, 270 N. Y. 43, 200 N. E. 67 (1936), (1937) 46 YALE L. 3.
1085.
11. Knowledge of plaintiff's fiduciary capacity put Transamerica on inquiry as to
her investment powers. See 4 BOGERT, TRUsrs AND TRusrEs (1935) § 897.
12. The liability of the transferee with notice seems rarely to have been invoked
to recover trust funds used in wrongful purchases of stock. Dunnegan Grove Cemetery
v. Farm and Home Savings and Loan Assoc., 93 S. W. (2d) 95 (Mo. App. 1936);
cf. Pink v. Title Guar. and Trust Co., 298 N. Y. Supp. 544 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (subor-
dinate interests in mortgages); Bonham v. Coe, 249 App. Div. 428, 292 N. Y. Supp.
423 (4th Dep't 1937) (farm exchanged for apartment house).
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cordingly, it can be required as a constructive trustee either to return the
trust fund if identifiable, or to reimburse the estate for the loss sustained.1V 3
Bank of America, however, received no compensation"' or other tangible
benefit 15 from the transaction and was held liable only because it performed
the physical act of transfer with constructive knowledge of its impropriety.
In some respects, its r6le as intermediary resembles that of a stockbroker,
who bears the liability of a participant for permitting trustees to speculate
with trust money.16 But since the broker receives a commission, and is
often inclined to induce disastrous speculation by the fiduciary,17 his motiva-
tion is hardly similar to the disinterested attitude of tie bank in the instant
case. More analogous is the liability of the transfer agent of a corporation,
which registers transfers of stock on the books of the company and issues
new certificates to the transferees.18 Though lack of registration does not
ordinarily affect the title of the transferee as against the transferor, the
transfer agent is none the less liable if it knowingly registers a transfer in
breach of trust; to protect the interests of beneficiaries it must assume the
risk of correctly determining the trustee's power of sale."' This duty of
inquiry has been modified by statute in many states,20 but the liability for
registration with actual knowledge of breach remains as an example of
participation by one having only a mnor part in the wrongful transaction.
If there is sound policy behind the requirement that transfer agents
supervise sales of stock by fiduciaries, that same policy would seem to require
that banks buying securities for fiduciaries be subjected to the same standard
of care. Where the investments of executors, administrators, and guardians
are limited by statute, as in New York, the bank's only duty would be to
prevent deviations from the statutory list.21 Since most transactions are of
13. 4 BOGERT, TRusTs AND TRusTEES (1935) §§ 866-867.
14. Cash payments made by plaintiff represented: (a) the increase in value of
Transamerica between the time the exchange was offered and her acceptahce; (b) the
price of a half-share ($82), so that she would get an even number. (Record on Apeal,
165-167).
15. Bank of America -as controlled by Transamerica; this accounts for its
undertaking gratuitously the task of forwarding the stock to be exchanged. The
court, however, dismissed the confusing questions of agency arising from this relation-
ship. Stark v. National City Bank, 161 Misc. 51, 57, 58, 291 N. Y. Supp. 8W4, 891,
892 (1936).
16. Leake v. Watson, 58 Conn. 332, 20 Atl. 343 (1890); English v. McIntyre, 29
App. Div. 439, 51 N. Y. Supp. 697 (1st Dep't 1898).
17. See (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1085, 1089, n. 29.
18. CaSiry, TRANSFER OF STOCK (1929) § 279.
19." Baker v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 173 N. C. 365, 92 S. E. 170 (1917);
Loring v. Salisbury Mills, 125 Mass. 138 (1878).
20. Section 3 of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act was recently enacted by New York
[N. Y. LAws 1937, c. 3441; it imposes liability on the transfer agent only when there
is actual knowledge of breach, or knowledge of facts amounting to bad faith. The
Uniform Act has been adopted by 15 states. 9 Uxironzx LAws ANN. 146.
21. Some states have no specific list for this class of fiduciaries, but the investment
statutes for savings banks can usually be followed. In others, however, which have
no lists at all, the intermediary, even after inquiry, would face considerable risk. For
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local origin, this burden would be less onerous than that of the transfer agent,
who registers transfers of fiduciaries throughout the country. More burden-
some would be imposition of a duty upon banks to investigate trustees'
powers of investment under trust instruments of varying, and sometimes
ambiguous, terms. But banks which choose to perform the functions of
brokers can safeguard their interests either by requiring the fiduciary to
prove his authority to purchase 22 or, in any event, by demanding adequate
compensation for assuming the risks incident to dealing with fiduciaries.
a collection of the statutes, see MCKINNEY, TRUST INVESTMENTS (2d ed. 1927) and
4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935), ch. 30. In other states, it would be necessary
merely to ask the fiduciary to produce a court order. Aside from statutes forbidding
investments without a court order, there are occasional provisions allowing a trustee
to obtain one for his own protection. See McKxNxEy, .supra.
22. In addition to investigating the propriety of the deal, banks in New York might
take the precaution of exacting a contract of indemnity from the fiduciary. Such a con-
tract, though seemingly against public policy, was upheld in Delafield v. Barret, 270
N. Y. 43, 200 N. E. 67 (1936).
